Costs? Accessibility? Who knows?

The Register picks up on a couple of points from the weekend's Observer and Mirror - namely, that the cost of ID Cards may triple, and that 600,000 disabled people won't be able to register under the biometrics scheme. The tripling figure comes from a London School of Economics report, which also notes that biometric certainty diminishes faster than the government hopes/thinks, so that records will have to be retaken every five years rather than every ten.

Getting away from the intricacies, the most interesting point is that the... "LSE report highlights the government's reluctance to disclose details of the scheme as one of the main problems with trying to work out the actual cost of implementing a national identity card scheme."

Hmm, what have they got to hide? Their excuse? "The Home Office has dismissed the report, saying that it does not accept the figures being quoted. It would not comment directly on the findings, however, because commercial contracts are confidential."

Right. A commercial contract that affects each and every one of us. So much for trust.

Do... you... understand?

Some really good analysis of that £1.3 billion figure from the Register - clear enough, even, to print out and post to my MP as some background reading.

Apart from tearing apart the government's claims of costs caused by ID fraud, it also highlights a survey issued by Detica that mentions not just public support for a scheme, but also the public's understanding of the issues at stake, too: although 94 per cent of people are aware of the ID card scheme, "two thirds have little or know knowledge of how it will work."

Isn't this an important aspect of democracy - education? It's hard not to be so sceptical of a government when it praises democracy, but keeps banging on about its own, flimsy figures while doing extremely little to actually explain the thing to the people it quotes.

Furthermore, the second article also addresses an interesting point regarding anti-scheme arguments: "the civil liberties arguments have not worked and will not work, and arguments (as pursued at some length by The Register, links below) that ID cards are an expensive irrelevance to the issues they profess to tackle also cut little ice. But the cost of the scheme and the public's lack of confidence are different matters." Indeed.

Stats and Sayings

A quick, intermediary post to follow up on the last, tying together some quotes and some more stats.

According to a spokesman for Blair, the scheme is about "getting a step ahead of the criminal or the terrorist." Practive vs Theory aside, the Times seems to dispute this, claiming that ministers will sell it on fraud, not terror aspects. The article also offers a glimpse of hope:

"The Home Secretary was also reported to be considering strengthening the powers of an ID card commissioner to oversee the scheme. He may also bring in measures to further limit government agencies’ access to the [register]" - both a move in the right direction, at least, if they were to come to pass.

In terms of stats, the Times article notes that... "A survey of 1,000 people yesterday revealed that the plans were backed by five out of 10 people as the best way to combat ID fraud. A MORI poll in April put the figure at 80 per cent in favour." - slightly more up to date than the December poll.

My favourite quote comes from a Computer Weekly article touching on the gulf between ID Cards and preventing telephone/on-line fraud. George Platt, general manager of the company commissioning the survey, said "The reality is the public has no idea."

Oh, and lastly on a sidenote... eh?

Day 101 in the Big Brother house...

The new ID system bill is due to be re-introduced today, in line with the last post. The Guardian report reads a bit like a press release at times ("the National Identity Register will be created ... to store details held on the cards, so they can be securely cross-checked." - securely? how can they be sure?), but has some more information including the fact that the results of the 10,000 strong volunteer trial will be published too - one wonders if that includes the withdrawn Cornish trial as well.

That's also 10 times as many people as the survey probably quoted by HO Under-Secretary Andy Burnham the other day, although he merely claims that support is still at 80% in "latest polls". Of course by his figures, that's still 1 in 5 that are against it.

The survey itself is pretty interesting reading, and makes you wonder how much of a dent campaigns such as NO2ID are making. Although, judging by the blatantly submissive responses (63% say that "police should have the power to make anyone produce their ID"), it's perhaps even more of an uphill battle than hoped. The killer is that only 10% would be willing to pay between 40 and 100 quid to get one of these Magic Cards. Considering that the Guardian article reports that "the cost of a passport will more than double to over £80 when new cards are introduced".. well, do the maths.

An update later probably, once more details are out. Time to start getting those letters to MPs and supporting NO2ID in the meantime.

Heads up...

NO2ID are reporting that the Mirror is reporting that the ID Bill might be pushed through before the end of May. My, they are keen, aren't they? Keen to avoid criticism, and to prevent as much scrutiny as possible, certainly in the eye of the public.

Experimental: Get blog posts via e-mail

I've been playing with some mailing lists so that you can (hopefully) get this blog sent straight to your e-mail inbox. As this is pretty untested, there may still be some things to iron out, but I figure the best way to find out what they are is to let people sign up and send feedback.

There are two lists - both get the main posts as they're published, but the first also gets comments. Both should be extremely low-traffic, and they're both moderated so you won't get spam. To subscribe to either (don't subscribe to both, there's no point...), click the appropriate link and fill in your details.

• All posts and comments


• Posts only, no comments

And don't forget, you can still access posts via the XML feed.

"Slot Respect A into Community B..."

Mark Steyn hammers home well in his Telegraph opinion piece, touching on things like the difference in social perspectives between adults and adolescents and making good points such as "the idea that the national government can legislate respect is a large part of the reason why there isn't any". And while I agree with him that enforcing a working week of less than 48 hours isn't necessarily the right thing to do, there's certainly an issue around why people do work - or want to work - as much as they do.

Of course, if thinking on this gets no further than "stick an orange suit on community offenders", then this "problem" is going to get a whole lot worse. (Fortunately, such blatantly pap plans are quickly shelved, but that doesn't detract from the fact that our politicians are still sitting in the Westminster Ivory Tower.)

The obvious irony is that ID Cards will be making a return later today... If Tony Blair wants people to respect each other (and, I assume, him) then why is he pushing for yet more draconian controls that move the balance of power away from the people, and into the Government's all-knowing arms? Screw the new-old government, I say. Its head is even further up its own arse than before.

The Two Faces of CCTV

CCTV is coming under fire in Polegate and Marlow, seemingly because while "disturbances" continued in high streets, the cameras themselves were either broken ("There was a problem with the actual camera itself") or just pointed in the wrong place (so presumably unmonitored - "[Youths] were not doing anything in particular, just standing on the steps. But the CCTV cameras were pointing at the railway signal box.").

This highlights one of the shortfalls of town surveillance cameras - their use is actually twofold, and when one purpose fails to achieve what it was supposed to, people can at least turn to the other. But when both fail, suddenly people wake up to the world they actually live in.

The first purpose is, as given in the two articles above, to catch video evidence of people committing crime (or anti-social behaviour, or whatever your gripe is this week), so the perps can be caught to be re-educated locked up for good.

The second purpose (as used to be pointed out all the time, I'm sure) is as a preventative measure - the theory being that if you think you're being watched, you're less likely to go ahead with the crime you're thinking of.*

Alas, in reality it turns out that people don't really care if they're being watched. Or if they do, then they're smart enough to at least keep half an eye on which direction the visible cameras are pointing in - no big deal. Hey - maybe there was something to the suggestion that CCTV merely displaces crime after all? "Time-shifting" might also be applicable here too...

The big assumption in our application of surveillance systems is that, somehow, by letting people know we're watching them, people will "improve". All this talk of ID, more cameras, more policemen, etc all assumes that the places in which we live can be improved by this monitoring - and by extension, we recapture the idea of a "civil society" that we like to romanticise about.

What a sham. If we're really honest with ourselves, all monitoring does is lock down the public face of our nation, allowing us in our public capacity to simply sweep aside all the factors that lead to the crime and attitude we're experiencing every day. By forcing the streets to behave and look nice for visitors (including ourselves), we can comfortably ignore the deep social distress being hidden by private walls and fences.

The second article above mentions that "a high visibility operation ..., in response to these concerns, had been a success." More officers works in the short term for the simple reason that they can react instantly. They are both the piercing eye of the CCTV camera and the radio link from surveillance central to the police station. But they do nothing to actually show us how we should behave, or what we can achieve if we're allowed to.

* On a side note, this thinking has now been extended on buses where I live. A monitor downstairs, in full public view, reflects the views from a dozen cameras around the bus. This is clearly not for the driver's attention as he/she can't see it. The obvious intention is that instant social embarassment is more of a deterrent that just having a camera watch you. I await the scheme's failure.

Leave yer attitude at the door

Man, I hate Bluewater shopping centre. But anyway. Hooded tops, baseball caps and swearing have been banned there in a police-backed decision. Apparently the 400, constantly-monitored CCTV cameras and the "dedicated on-site team" of Police have actually done.. not a lot. So now they're drawing up a "code of conduct" (i.e. their own law) to stop people from being antisocial (including smoking, leafleting or canvassing).

This is our nation's future, right here. When we've fallen apart so much we don't know how to treat each other, the only solution left is more and more stringent rules to keep out the people we've already kept out for ages. Hardware and force are our new-age replacements for commitment to society, and arrogant selfishness embeds itself firmly as the mantra of the masses.

Meanwhile, across the pond....

Looks like America is getting an ID Card - the passed bill H.R.1268 - Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the "Global War on Terror", Tsunami Relief, et al - also manages to somehow sneak in H.R.418, which expands the grounds for which a person can be refused entry into the United States, increases the burden of proof of innocence on asylum seekers, removes checks on how "exploitable" the asylum system is, shifts the balance of power over definition by letting the Department of Homeland Security determine what "terrorism" is, and what "engaging in terrorist activities" means, and a whole bunch of other stuff. (Congressional Research Services have an excellent analysis* [PDF]). Most importantly, it upgrades state-issued driving licenses and other photo identification to act as ID Cards; under the Bill, a set of requirements mandated by Congress must be adhered to by each state out of their own pocket. (Over here in the UK, of course, we have to fund our own ID card personally...) Unsurprisingly, the states are bothered by this somewhat. Furthermore, the information collected would (like the UK) be stored in a central database.

Crypto expert Bruce Schneier blasts the idea of ID cards, and his article along with two previous ones [1, 2] go into good depth on why the bill is a bad one, and secondly provide arguments that are equally relevant to the ID situation here in the UK too. Of particular note:

"In theory, if we know who you are, and if we have enough information about you, we can somehow predict whether you're likely to be an evildoer. ... Profiling has two very dangerous failure modes. The first one is obvious. The intent of profiling is to divide people into two categories: people who may be evildoers and need to be screened more carefully, and people who are less likely to be evildoers and can be screened less carefully. But any such system will create a third, and very dangerous, category: evildoers who don't fit the profile."

There are number of assumptions as to how ID Cards will prevent ... well, anything. These are:

• the card is non-forgable. Has any documentation ever been non-forgable/tie-able to a particular person?


• the profiling system (if used - and hey, if you have all that data on file, why not if it helps "protect the citizen"?) is accurate enough to discern people according to what screening is wanted - more uncharted, highly dubious territory


• the people deciding where the lines of discernment should fall are acting in the card-owners' best interests

That last one is up to you to decide, ultimately. But, for example, if the definition of "terrorist" is in the hands of the people who stand to gain most from waging war against terrorists, how much can you really trust them? Schlumberger say ID Cards are a good thing for the nation. Schlumberger sell ID Cards. The Police asy ID Cards are a good thing for security. The Police's sole purpose of existence is security. We, as individuals, are about more than that.

More about the US REAL ID act at unrealid.com.

* Which includes the great example arising from the new, expanded definitions:

"...if organization A has a subgroup A1 that raises funds for organization B (among other groups) and organization B distributes funds to organization C (among other groups), which has a subgroup C1 that at some point provided support to a terrorist activity or organisation, organisation A apparently would qualify as a terrorist oragnisation ... absent the group's ability to somehow extricate itself by showing it could not have reasonably drawn the connection between its subgroup's fund raising and subgroup C1."

The Ubiquity of Unnatural Surveillance

Bit of a surveillance round-up. ParkingEye are running a press release to gather business in Scotland for their panoptic product line-up, so I shouldn't give them too much coverage... ;) Traffic wardens are among the various human factors that people love to hate, so it makes sense to automate them - after all, who could hate a lovable (unseen and impenetrable) robot? Awww.

Still, if you do manage to get around the scheme, expect them to chaneg the rules to say "you can't". Phew, just as well they've got every base covered.

Meanwhile in Muswell Hill, traders are crying out for a surveillance society. As usual, the folks looking for a quick fix to their own problem are ready and willing to sell out (read "lock up") the people who are supposed to be their neighbours. And, they would say, why not? Why not indeed? These nuisances of society deserve to be watched and treated suspiciously at all times, surely?

How about this - why not start addressing the problem of why people are getting so rat-arsed in the first place? Why not wake up to how we got here in the first place? The death of the human soul, the greying result of a culture in which work is more important than life, in which money is worth more than love, and in which getting people to like you is more attractive than liking yourself.

Our counter-culture of "partying" is a direct reaction to our culture of obsessive repression, and our fear of "failure". CCTV and all of its brethrenly observational ilk do nothing more than control us even further, beyond the controls we impress upon ourselves 10 hours a day. This is why surveillance will always produce nothing but underground revelry and a false sense of security.

Back in the closet

Well, Blunkett's back, albeit as work and pensions sec. Does this mean we'll be moving away from criticising Labour's authoritatian streak and start dusting down our jackets? Hell no. Flinging aside the aspersions cast on Mr B's character leading to his exit, Blair has decided that Dave is feeling better, and is now prepared to step back into society and start tossing his orb about.

Rest assured, more blog inches will be dedicated to Clarke's ongoing campaigns, which may face harder opposition now Labour's majority has been squashed somewhat:

"Out of the 19 Labour MPs who voted against the government, 16 have been returned to parliament (with the remaining three standing down), while all 10 of the Conservative MPs who defied Michael Howard's instruction to abstain and instead voted with the Labour rebels have been re-elected. Other anti-ID card MPs who also won seats last night include Labour outcast George Galloway and Wyre Forest Independent Richard Taylor."

And, as Spyblog points out, Des Browne moves from Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality to a new spot as Chief Secretary to the Treasury. We await to see

Touching Roots

BIAA has been pretty quiet recently - personal pressures, and the Signal-to-Noise ratio during the electioneering phase take their toll. Anyway, the election is in full swing, as it were, and here's the data on Blunkett, if you're interested.

Attention deflected, Cap'n.

Been away for a few days, so only been loosely following the Order of Things. Election time fills me with manic glumness as promises and pooh-poohed arguments fall over themselves to get media attention. The fate of the next 4 years decided by a month of political polemic, good-oh.

The Kamel Bourgass story has been particularly notable for its lack of level-headedness, though. I suggest ignoring the print media on this one, and going straight to both The Register and Spy Blog for more interesting takes on the matter. The bandwagon stirred up around this one is well worth a look, just to note how well the public media machine lumbers into life when needed. Also worth a peek, perhaps, is the BBC's amusing analysis, which highlights documents attributed to Bin Laden "downloaded from the internet", and the finding of "scales, thermometers, rubber gloves, a coffee grinder, batteries and bulbs" in the flat. Heavens, I never knew washing up was considered so dangerous.

Meanwhile, I'll be writing to my MP to make sure that castor beans are banned, or at least subject to identity checks at point of purchase. Rice should also be carefully controlled, due to its aural similarity to "ricin" which may confuse eavesdroppers, leading to yet more embarassing arrest scenarios that have to be covered up in a blanket of spin.

Question 1. Define "terrorism". (10 marks)

This is a strange one. In February 2003, Hazil Rahaman-Alan concealed a grenade in his luggage upon flying to Gatwick, with the intent of blowing everyone up. "The grenade would be his microphone to the world." Furthermore, "during the flight, he had drawn attention to himself by moving around the aircraft and appearing to be nervous". Stopped at random at Gatwick, he was charged under the Terrorism Act, but this has now been changed to the Explosives Act and the Aviation Act. Why? Because he's not a terrorist...

Back in 2003, the Guardian article notes, the Met police commissioner warned alongside the original arrest that al-Qaida terrorists had a "substantial presence" in Britain. Yet this al-Qaida hitman is now apparently completely otherwise. No real reason for this reversal is given, although the BBC article notes that "his motives were obscure."

Why is this important? Because it's about boundaries, and where lines are drawn. One man, with an intent to kill a plane load of people in the name of getting people with power to listen, is an evil terrorist, while the other is a slightly disturbed loon, perhaps. The difference? In this case, perhaps the mental state of the accused, or perhaps the plight he was trying to bring attention to ("starving children in Africa", possibly), or maybe even the fact that his plan would never have succeeded.

The focus, here, is on how we use language. What is a "terrorist" anyway, and how are they different to a "suicide bomber" or a "political activist"? More importantly, what are we trying to achieve when we paint someone with any of these terms, even before they've had a fair trial? And what, maybe as in this case, are we capable of totally ignoring while we carry out our modern-day witch-hunts?


Meanwhile, Stephen Wilkinson has defected from Labour to the Lib Dems, due to Labour's authoritarian angles. As the Beeb puts it, "he also criticised the use of the threat of terror to push for house arrest and compulsory ID cards and to justify the war in Iraq."

Caution: Constitutional upset in progress.

Another day, another harsh criticism of the ID Register Bill. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution has released its 6 page report (PDF).

Not got time to read through it right now, but the Register has an accompanying article. Some good advice, it would seem, being presented, but it remains to be seen whether the Home Secretary will actually listen to any of it - there doesn't appear to be much sign of movement at this stage of the procedings.

Meeting a soldier? Watch your back...

A curious one, this. BBC news reports that one Abu Baker Mansha has been charged under the Terrorism Act, "after allegedly being found with a soldier's name and address written on a piece of paper."

No other details, although hopefully Google News will turn up some goods soon. It'd obviously be stupid to infer anything in either direction with such little info, and it's hard from the report to tell if the address was actually "written", or otherwise. (The Beeb say the former, then claim the charge says the paper merely contained the name and address.) The form of the address may lend some clue to how it was obtained and, therefore, maybe what it was being used for (think about when you write an address down as opposed to when you have a printed copy), but naturally it wouldn't be good to speculate... At least, that's what common sense dictates. The intelligence agencies may say different.

Furthermore, why was he charged 4 days after being arrested? I'm not a Policeman. Do these things usually take that long?

The trial should be tomorrow (Tuesday). Meanwhile, all soldiers have been relocated and had their names changed to protect the security of this glorious nation*. Huzzah!

(*quite possibly not true)

Update: Thee BBC link above now mentions article 58 (1b) of the Terrorism Act, which says:

58. - (1) A person commits an offence if-

(a) he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or

(b) he possesses a document or record containing information of that kind.

It goes on to say:

(2) In this section "record" includes a photographic or electronic record.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for his action or possession.

Hmm, note that "reasonable excuse" is a defence after the charge has been made, not a reason for not charging in the first place... (IANAL... is that right?)

I'm having a little trouble finding out just what "information" is "likely to be useful" to a terrorist. The Act itself doesn't seem to define it.

It's probably also worth looking at section 103 too, which runs along similar lines as the charge above, only more vague:

103.- (1) A person commits an offence if-

(a) he collects, makes a record of, publishes, communicates or attempts to elicit information about a person to whom this section applies which is of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or

(b) he possesses a document or record containing information of that kind.

The people in question, that it's illegal to write down information about, or tell anyone else about, are: constables, members of Her Majesty's Forces (e.g. soldiers), holders of a judicial office, officers of any court, or full-time employees of the Northern Ireland prison service. Oh, "information" also includes a photograph. So those photos of my mate's sister, who happens to be a police officer, are illegal?

Furthermore, you're liable, if charged, for this information if you were "on any premises at the same time" as it, or if you regularly visit(ed) those premises. Ignorace of such evidence has to then be proven by you, i.e. somehow, you have to work out a way of saying that you weren't aware of something. I suggest that students of philosophical logic should start applying as Barristers now.

Man, if they want you toasted, you're toast. To quote... "In fact, you're gonna have to work very hard to stay alive."

This is about us and us, not us and them.

No links. Instead, a thought just struck me, like a heavily-laden seagull smacking into a glass window.

All along, I've been thinking that ID Cards are a tool to challenge the existing lines of trust between the public and the government. This is still true, but (I've realised) more importantly, the real deal, an ID system will change the lines of trust between ourselves. Think about it for a moment. Here we have presented to us a method of "proving" that we are who we say we are. Its primary purpose, no matter what the "secondary" effects - disrupting terrorism, catching illegal workers etc - are, is to act as a single, unequivocal means by which the person looking at the card can be sure that we are who we say we are. Without this, the database behind it and all the associated "entitlement" schemes fall down. It is a Trust Card, first and foremost.

In effect, it is a system designed to replace the many informal ways of doing this that we have established already. It is a system that turns our social aspects into technical ones. Many say that this is more efficient, that we can only prevent disaster and crisis by having such a foolproof scheme in place, and to some extent (i.e. a theoretical extent and ignoring many other factors) this could be true. But in thinking this, we lose sight of what we will begin to lack as well.

Take a moment to reflect on the ways in which trust is built up. Do you trust your doctor? Does your doctor trust you? How about teachers, parents, the person in the local housing office, your estate agent, your bank manager, your local police? Why do you trust them to the degree that you do? ID cards, intent on providing proof, act formally. Under an ID system, you are only considered "trustworthy" if you can show something that was given to you by someone you've probably never met. Up until then, it would be fair to treat you as suspicious, just because everone else has their card, so why don't you? Whether or not the cards prove anything in reality is beside the point.

OK, so it's not like our human instincts are being completely over-ridden here. Just because someone presents their card to you, it doesn't mean you're forced to trust them... does it? Maybe not, but then you were never likely to in the first place. The damage is done to all those people who you had no reason to suspect of anything really, but were just suspicious of because they hadn't proved their ID yet.

First impressions count.

Brighton happenin' and pre-election warm-up voting.

Fiddlesticks, I forgot to mention the No2ID Brighton and Hove public meeting against ID cards, 7.30pm today. I am a fool. See you there.

Oh, we've also apparently made the Guardian shortlist for "single issue" blogs - how odd. Go vote, or something. Actually, go check out the other categories too, for more fun political blogging.

The sound of inevitability

The Register summarises identity theft among large organisations in March, big figures that those looking to implement nationwide identity schemes should probably take some note of. The HO FAQ addresses these in a couple of places:

What’s the benefit of having biometrics? "Use of biometrics will also make it much more difficult for a fraudster to obtain a second identity card as the biometrics can be checked against those already on the National Identity Register to see if they are already registered. It will also provide an additional means of associating an individual to a particular identity card, which greatly increases the security and robustness by supplementing more traditional methods such as photographs and signatures."

Won’t an identity card be attractive to fraudsters and organised criminals? "Yes just as current identity documents are. This is why we will have strengthened identity checking procedures, biometrics and improved physical security measures both for existing identity documents and for identity cards."

So the government line tends to amount to not much more than "biometrics, biometrics, biometrics". Quite why the HO thinks it can guard customers' -- sorry, citizens' identities more securely than a large company, I'm not sure - maybe if their track record in technical projects had some semblance of success, I might be inclined to believe them... There are surely more constructs needed to ensure the necessary security than mere hardware aren't there? How much attention to education regarding the system should there be, for instance? What penalties/responsibility should there be for being careless with your own data, say?

As the Reg article points out, "The vast majority of incidents can be traced to ... just plain stupidity among those who 'own' our personal data." Shouldn't the government be planning some contingency for what happens if (/when) details are stolen and usable on a wide scale, rather than just assume they're not going to be?